Russia Country Report on Human Rights Practices

Reports on Russia

Russia Country Report on Human Rights Practices - 2005

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 8, 2006

Preface
Introduction
Country Report: Russia

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Preface

March 8, 2006

All men and women desire and deserve to live in dignity and liberty. As President Bush said: "The advance of freedom is the great story of our time." Promoting human rights and democracy is a worldwide phenomenon and there is a growing global discussion of democracy and the universal values protected by democratic governance.

The increasing demand for democratic governance reflects recognition that the best guarantor of human rights is a thriving democracy with representative, accountable institutions of government, equal rights under the rule of law, a robust civil society, political pluralism, and independent media.

The United States and other free nations have a duty to defend human rights and help spread democracy’s blessings. We must help countries develop the democratic institutions that will ensure human rights are respected over the long term. We must help fragile democracies deliver a better life for their citizens. We must call countries to account when they retreat from their international human rights commitments. And we must always stand in solidarity with the courageous men and women across the globe who live in fear yet dream of freedom.

By defending and advancing human rights and democratic principles, we keep faith with our country’s most cherished values and lay the foundation for lasting peace. Fulfilling the promise of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and building vibrant democracies worldwide will take generations, but it is work of the utmost urgency that cannot be delayed.

With these thoughts in mind, I am pleased to transmit the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 to the United States Congress.

Condoleezza Rice
Secretary of State

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Introduction

These reports describe the performance of 196 countries in putting into practice their international commitments on human rights. These basic rights, reflected in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have been embraced by people of every culture and color, every background and belief, and constitute what President Bush calls the "non-negotiable demands of human dignity."

The Department of State published the first annual country reports on human rights practices in 1977 in accordance with congressional mandate, and they have become an essential element of the United States’ effort to promote respect for human rights worldwide. For nearly three decades, the reports have served as a reference document and a foundation for cooperative action among governments, organizations, and individuals seeking to end abuses and strengthen the capacity of countries to protect the fundamental rights of all.

The worldwide championing of human rights is not an attempt to impose alien values on citizens of other countries or to interfere in their internal affairs. The Universal Declaration calls upon "every individual and every organ of society … to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance…"

President Bush has committed the United States to working with other democracies and men and women of goodwill across the globe to reach an historic long-term goal: "the end of tyranny in our world."

To be sure, violations of human rights and miscarriages of justice can and do occur in democratic countries. No governmental system is without flaws. Human rights conditions in democracies across the globe vary widely, and these country reports reflect that fact. In particular, democratic systems with shallow roots and scarce resources can fall far short of meeting their solemn commitments to citizens, including human rights commitments. Democratic transitions can be tumultuous and wrenching. Rampant corruption can retard democratic development, distort judicial processes, and destroy public trust. Nonetheless, taken overall, countries with democratic systems provide far greater protections against violations of human rights than do nondemocratic states.

The United States’ own journey toward liberty and justice for all has been long and difficult, and it is still far from complete. Yet over time our independent branches of government, our free media, our openness to the world, and, most importantly, the civic courage of impatient American patriots help us keep faith with our founding ideals and our international human rights obligations.

These country reports offer a factual basis by which to assess the progress made on human rights and the challenges that remain. The reports review each country’s performance in 2005, not one country’s performance against that of another. While each country report speaks for itself, cross-cutting observations can be made. Six broad observations, supported by country-specific examples, are highlighted below. The examples are illustrative, not exhaustive.

First, countries in which power is concentrated in the hands of unaccountable rulers tend to be the world’s most systematic human rights violators. These states range from closed, totalitarian systems that subject their citizens to a wholesale deprivation of their basic rights to authoritarian systems in which the exercise of basic rights is severely restricted.

In 2005 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) remained one of the world’s most isolated countries. The systematically repressive regime continued to control almost all aspects of citizens' lives, denying freedoms of speech, religion, the press, assembly, association, and movement, as well as workers’ rights. In December 2005, the regime further receded into isolation by calling for significant drawdowns of the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) presence in the country.

In Burma where a junta rules by diktat, promises of democratic reform and respect for human rights continued to serve as a faзade for brutality and repression. Forced labor, trafficking in persons, use of child soldiers, and religious discrimination remained serious concerns. The military’s continuing abuses included systematic use of rape, torture, execution, and forced relocation of citizens belonging to ethnic minorities. The regime maintained iron-fisted control through the surveillance, harassment, and imprisonment of political activists, including Nobel Laureate and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who remained under house arrest without charge.

In 2005 the Iranian government’s already poor record on human rights and democracy worsened. In the June presidential elections, slightly more than a thousand registered candidates – including all the female candidates – were arbitrarily thrown out of contention by the country’s guardian council. The newly elected hard-line president denied the Holocaust occurred and called for the elimination of Israel. The ruling clerics and the president oversaw deterioration in prison conditions for the hundreds of political prisoners, further restrictions on press freedom, and a continuing rollback of social and political freedoms. Serious abuses such as summary executions, severe violations of religious freedom, discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, disappearances, extremist vigilantism, and use of torture and other degrading treatment continued.

In Zimbabwe the government maintained a steady assault on human dignity and basic freedoms, tightening its hold on civil society and human rights NGOs and manipulating the March parliamentary elections. Opposition members were subjected to abuse, including torture and rape. New constitutional amendments allowed the government to restrict exit from the country, transferred title to the government of all land reassigned in the land acquisition program, and removed the right to challenge land acquisitions in court. The government’s Operation Restore Order, initiated to demolish allegedly illegal housing and businesses, displaced or destroyed the livelihoods of more than 700 thousand persons and further strained the country’s weak and depressed economy.

In Cuba the regime continued to control all aspects of life through the communist party and state-controlled mass organizations. The regime suppressed calls for democratic reform, such as the Varela Project, which proposed a national referendum. Authorities arrested, detained, fined, and threatened Varela activists and the government held at least 333 political prisoners and detainees.

China's human rights record remained poor, and the government continued to commit serious abuses. Those who publicly advocated against Chinese government policies or views or protested against government authority faced harassment, detention, and imprisonment by government and security authorities. Disturbances of public order and protests calling for redress of grievances increased significantly, and several incidents were violently suppressed. Key measures to increase the authority of the judiciary and reduce the arbitrary power of police and security forces stalled. Restrictions of the media and the Internet continued. Repression of minority groups continued unabated, particularly of Uighurs and Tibetans. New religious affairs regulations were adopted expanding legal protection for some activities of registered religious groups, but repression of unregistered religious groups continued, as did repression of the Falun Gong spiritual movement.

In Belarus President Lukashenko continued to arrogate all power to himself and his dictatorial regime. Pro-democracy activists, including opposition politicians, independent trade union leaders, students, and newspaper editors, were detained, fined, and imprisoned for criticizing Lukashenko and his regime. His government increasingly used tax inspections and new registration requirements to complicate or deny NGOs, independent media, political parties, and minority and religious organizations the ability to operate legally.

Second, human rights and democracy are closely linked, and both are essential to long-term stability and security. Free and democratic nations that respect the rights of their citizens help to lay the foundation for lasting peace. In contrast, states that severely and systematically violate the human rights of their own people are likely to pose threats to neighboring countries and the international community.

Burma is a case in point. Only by Burma’s return to the democratic path from which it was wrenched can the basic rights of the Burmese people be realized. The junta refuses to recognize the results of the historic free and fair legislative elections in 1990. The regime’s cruel and destructive misrule has inflicted tremendous suffering on the Burmese people and caused or exacerbated a host of ills for its neighbors, from refugee outflows to the spread of infectious diseases and the trafficking of drugs and human beings. On December 16, the UN Security Council held a landmark discussion on the situation in Burma.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is another example. When the Korean peninsula was divided, the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) were at roughly the same economic point, and both were subject to authoritarian rule. Political and economic freedom has made the difference between the two Koreas. Today, North Koreans are deprived of the most basic freedoms, while the regime’s authoritarian rule produced tens of thousands of refugees. The government earned hard currency through illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting of currency and goods such as cigarettes, and smuggling. Pyongyang has not heeded the international community’s repeated calls to dismantle its nuclear programs.

The Iranian government continued to ignore the desire of the Iranian people for responsible, accountable government, continuing its dangerous policies of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, providing support to terrorist organizations, and advocating – including in several public speeches by the new president – the destruction of a UN member state. Iran’s deprivation of basic rights to its own people, its interference in Iraq, its support for Hizballah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations, and its refusal to engage constructively on these issues, have further isolated it from the world community.

Similarly, the government of Syria refused international calls to respect the fundamental freedoms of its people and end its interference in the affairs of its neighbors. Syria continued to provide support for Hizballah, Hamas, and other Palestinian rejectionist groups and did not cooperate fully with the UN International Independent Investigative Commission on the assassination in Beirut of former Lebanese Prime Minister al-Hariri. The Chief Investigator’s reports concluded that evidence pointed to involvement by Syrian authorities and made it clear that Syrian officials, while purporting to cooperate, deliberately misled the investigators.

By contrast, in the Balkans, a marked overall improvement in human rights, democracy, and the rule of law over the past several years has led to greater stability and security in the region. Increasingly democratic governments are in place, more war criminals are facing justice, significant numbers of displaced persons have returned home, elections are progressively more compliant with international standards, and neighbors are deepening their cooperation to resolve post-conflict and regional problems. Many countries of the former Yugoslavia have made progress in bringing persons accused of war crimes to trial in domestic courts, which is important to national reconciliation and regional stability. At the end of 2005, however, two of the most wanted war crimes suspects, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, remained at large.

Third, some of the most serious violations of human rights are committed by governments within the context of internal and/or cross-border armed conflicts. The Sudanese government’s 2003 attempt to quell a minor uprising of African rebels in Darfur by arming janjaweed militias and allowing them to ravage the region resulted in a vicious conflict. The Department of State in September of 2004 determined that genocide occurred in Darfur. It continued in 2005. By the end of 2005, at least 70 thousand civilians had perished, nearly 2 million had been displaced by the fighting, and more than 200 thousand refugees had fled into neighboring Chad. Torture was widespread and systematic in Darfur, as was violence against women, including rape used as a tool of war. There were reports of women being marched away into the desert; their fate remained unknown. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement opened the way to adopt a constitution in July and form a government of national unity to serve until elections in 2009. The African Union deployed seven thousand troops to Darfur, where their presence helped curb some but not all of the violence. At the end of 2005, government-supported janjaweed attacks on civilians continued.

Nepal’s poor human rights record worsened. The government continued to commit many serious abuses, both during and after the February-April state of emergency that suspended all fundamental rights except for habeas corpus. In many cases the government disregarded habeas corpus orders issued by the Supreme Court and often rearrested student and political party leaders. The Maoist insurgents also continued their campaign of torturing, killing, bombing, conscripting children, kidnapping, extorting, and forcing closures of schools and businesses.

The political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, which continued to divide the country, led to further abuses in 2005, including rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings committed by government and rebel security forces. There were fewer reports of rebel recruitment of child soldiers, and many were released. Violence and threats of violence against the political opposition continued. Despite continued efforts by the international community and the African Union, the political process to establish a power-sharing government remained stalled. By the end of September, little work had been completed to prepare for the scheduled October 30 elections, and disarmament of the New Forces rebel group had not begun. On October 6, the African Union decided to extend President Laurent Gbagbo’s term in office by up to one year.

In Chechnya and elsewhere in Russia’s Northern Caucasus region, federal forces and pro-Moscow Chechen forces engaged in abuses including torture, summary executions, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. Pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitaries at times appeared to act independently of the Russian command structure, and there was been no indication that the federal authorities made any effective effort to rein them in or hold them accountable for egregious abuses. Antigovernment forces also continued to commit terrorist bombings and serious human rights abuses in the North Caucasus. The year 2005 saw the continued spread of violence and abuses throughout the region, where there was an overall climate of lawlessness and corruption.

The Great Lakes region of central Africa, encompassing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, has been plagued by civil war, large-scale interethnic violence, and severe conflict-related human rights abuses for well over a decade. However, there was less violence overall in 2005, and the human rights situation improved markedly, encouraging tens of thousands of displaced persons, particularly Burundians, to return home. Burundi concluded its four-year transitional process, and there were historical electoral advances in the DRC. Governments in the Great Lakes region made significant progress in demobilizing thousands of child soldiers in their military forces and those belonging to various rebel groups. At the same time, various armed groups based in eastern Congo continued to destabilize the region and compete with one another for strategic and natural resources, despite UN-supported Congolese military operations to disband armed groups in the DRC. Thousands of rebels from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, including Rwandan rebels who led the 1994 Rwandan genocide, continued to oppose the government of their respective countries, attack civilians in the DRC, and commit numerous serious abuses, particularly against women and children. The governments of Rwanda and Uganda reportedly continued illegally to channel arms to armed groups operating and committing abuses in the eastern DRC.

In Colombia, human rights violations related to the 41-year internal armed conflict continued. However, the government’s concentrated military offensive against illegal armed groups and ongoing demobilization of paramilitary groups led to reductions in killings and kidnappings. Colombia also began a four-year process to implement a new adversarial accusatory-style criminal procedures code. However, impunity remained a major obstacle, particularly for officials accused of committing past human rights abuses, as well as for certain members of the military who collaborated with paramilitary groups.

Fourth, where civil society and independent media are under siege, fundamental freedoms of expression, association, and assembly are undermined. A robust civil society and independent media help create conditions under which human rights can flourish by raising awareness among publics about their rights, exposing abuses, pressing for reform, and holding governments accountable.

Governments should defend – not abuse – the peaceful exercise of fundamental freedoms by members of the media and civil society even if they do not agree with their views or actions. Restrictions that are imposed by law on the exercise of such freedoms can only be justified to the extent they are consistent with a country’s human rights obligations and are not merely a pretext for restricting such rights.

When states wield the law as a political weapon or an instrument of repression against civil society and the media, they rule by law rather than upholding the rule of law. The rule of law acts as a check on state power, i.e., it is a system designed to protect the human rights of the individual against the power of the state. In contrast, rule by law can be an abuse of power, i.e., the manipulation of the law and the judicial system to maintain the power of the rulers over the ruled.

In 2005, a disturbing number of countries across the globe passed or selectively applied laws against the media and NGOs. For example:

The Cambodian government utilized existing criminal defamation laws to intimidate, arrest, and prosecute critics and opposition members over the course of the year.

China increased restrictions on the media and the Internet, leading to two known arrests.

The Zimbabwean government arrested persons who criticized President Mugabe, harassed and arbitrarily detained journalists, closed an independent newspaper, forcibly dispersed demonstrators, and arrested and detained opposition leaders and their supporters.

In Venezuela new laws governing libel, defamation, and broadcast media content, coupled with legal harassment and physical intimidation, resulted in limitations on media freedoms and a climate of self-censorship. There continued to be reports that government representatives and supporters intimidated and threatened members of the political opposition, several human rights NGOs, and other civil society groups. Some NGOs also charged that the government used the judiciary to place limitations on the political opposition.

In Belarus the Lukashenko government stepped up its suppression of opposition groups and imposed new restrictions on civil society. There were politically motivated arrests, several independent newspapers were closed, the operations of others were hindered, and NGOs were harassed.

In Russia raids on NGO offices, registration problems, intimidation of NGO leaders and staff and visa problems for foreign NGO workers had a negative effect, as did the parliament’s adoption of a new restrictive law on NGOs. The Kremlin also acted to limit critical voices in the media. The government decreased the diversity of the broadcast media, particularly television, the main source of news for the majority of Russians. By the end of 2005, all independent nationwide television stations had been taken over either by the state or by state-friendly organizations.

Fifth, democratic elections by themselves do not ensure that human rights will be respected, but they can put a country on the path to reform and lay the groundwork for institutionalizing human rights protections. Democratic elections are, however, milestones on a long journey of democratization. They are essential to establishing accountable governments and governmental institutions that abide by the rule of law and are responsive to the needs of citizens.

In Iraq 2005 was a year of major progress for democracy, democratic rights and freedom. There was a steady growth of NGOs and other civil society associations that promote human rights. The January 30th legislative elections marked a tremendous step forward in solidifying governmental institutions to protect human rights and freedom in a country whose history is marred by some of the worst human rights abuses in the recent past. In an October 15 referendum and December 15 election, Iraqi voters adopted a permanent constitution and elected members of the country’s new legislature, the Council of Representatives, thus consolidating democratic institutions that can provide a framework for a democratic future. Although the historic elections and new institutions of democratic government provided a structure for real advances, civic life and the social fabric remained under intense strain from the widespread violence principally inflicted by insurgent and terrorist elements. Additionally, elements of sectarian militias and security forces frequently acted independently of government authority. Still, the government set and adhered to a legal and electoral course based on respect for political rights.

Although deprived of basic human rights for years, Afghans in 2005 continued to show their courage and commitment to a future of freedom and respect for human rights. September 18 marked the first parliamentary elections in nearly three decades. Women enthusiastically voted in the elections, which included 582 female candidates for office. Sixty-eight women were elected to the lower House in seats reserved for women under the 2004 Constitution. Seventeen of the 68 women would have been elected in their own right even without the set-aside seats. In the upper House, 17 of the 34 seats appointed by the president were reserved for women; the Provincial Councils elected an additional 5 women for a total of 22 women. The September 18 parliamentary elections occurred against the backdrop of a government still struggling to expand its authority over provincial centers, due to continued insecurity and violent resistance in some quarters.

In Ukraine there were notable improvements in human rights performance following the Orange Revolution, which led to the election of a new government reflecting the will of the people. In 2005 there was increased accountability by police officers, and the mass media made gains in independence. Interference with freedom of assembly largely ceased, and most limitations on freedom of association were lifted. A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups also generally operated without government harassment.

Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim majority country, made significant progress in strengthening the architecture of its democratic system. Through a series of historic local elections, Indonesians were able directly to elect their leaders at the city, regency, and provincial levels for the first time. There were improvements in the human rights situation, although significant problems remained, and serious violations continued. A critical development was the landmark August 15 peace agreement with the Free Aceh Movement ending decades of armed conflict. The government also inaugurated the Papuan People's Assembly and took other steps toward fulfilling the 2001 Special Autonomy Law on Papua.

Lebanon made significant progress in ending the 29-year Syrian military occupation and regaining sovereignty under a democratically elected parliament. However, continuing Syrian influence remained a problem.

Liberia emerged into the international democratic arena with its dramatic step away from a violent past and toward a free and democratic future. On November 23, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was declared the winner of multiparty presidential elections, making her Africa’s first elected female head of state and marking a milestone in the country's transition from civil war to democracy. The transitional government generally respected the human rights of its citizens and passed legislation to strengthen human rights. However, police abuse, official corruption, and other problems persisted and were exacerbated by the legacy of the 14-year civil war, including severely damaged infrastructure and widespread poverty and unemployment.

Sixth, progress on democratic reform and human rights is neither linear nor guaranteed. Some states still have weak institutions of democratic government and continue to struggle; others have yet to fully commit to the democratic process. Steps forward can be marred with irregularities. There can be serious setbacks. Democratically elected governments do not always govern democratically once in power.

In 2005, many countries that have committed themselves to democratic reform showed mixed progress; some regressed.

The Kyrgyz Republic’s human rights record improved considerably following the change in leadership between March and July, although problems remained. President Akayev fled the country after opposition demonstrators took over the main government building in the capital to protest flawed elections. The July presidential election and November parliamentary election constituted improvements in some areas over previous elections. However, constitutional reform stalled and corruption remained a serious problem.

In Ecuador, congress removed democratically elected President Lucio Gutierrez in April following large scale protests and public withdrawal of support by the military and the national police leadership. Vice President Alfredo Palacio succeeded Gutierrez, and elections were scheduled for 2006.

Although the transitional government of the Democratic Republic of Congo postponed national general elections until 2006, the country held its first democratic national poll in 40 years. Voters overwhelmingly approved a new constitution in a largely free and fair national referendum, despite some irregularities.

In June, the Ugandan parliament approved a controversial amendment to eliminate presidential term limits, clearing the way for President Museveni to seek a third term. However, citizens voted in a national referendum to adopt a multiparty system of government, and the parliament amended the electoral laws to include opposition party participation in elections and in government.

The Egyptian government amended its constitution to provide for the country’s first multiparty presidential election in September. Ten political parties fielded candidates, and the campaign period was marked by vigorous public debate and greater political awareness and engagement. Voter turnout was low, however, and there were credible reports of widespread fraud during balloting. Presidential runner-up Ayman Nour, his parliamentary immunity stripped away in January, was sentenced in December on forgery charges to five years’ imprisonment after a six-month trial that failed to meet basic international standards. The November and December parliamentary elections witnessed significant gains by candidates affiliated with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. These elections were marred by excessive use of force by security forces, low turnout, and vote-rigging. The government refused to admit international observers for either the presidential or parliamentary elections. The National Council for Human Rights, established by the Egyptian parliament, issued its first annual report, frankly describing government abuses.

During the Ethiopian parliamentary elections in May, international observers noted numerous irregularities and voter intimidation. Scores of demonstrators protesting the elections were killed by security forces. Authorities detained, beat, and killed opposition members, NGO workers, ethnic minorities, and members of the press.

Azerbaijan’s November parliamentary elections, while an improvement in some areas, failed to meet a number of international standards. There were numerous credible reports of local officials interfering with the campaign process and misusing state resources, limited freedom of assembly, disproportionate use of force by police to disrupt rallies, and fraud and major irregularities in vote counting and tabulation. Thus far, additional actions taken during the postelection grievance process have not fully addressed the shortcomings of the electoral process.

Kazakhstan showed improvements in the pre-election period for the December presidential election, but overall it fell short of international standards for free and fair elections. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights noted serious limitations on political speech that prohibited certain kinds of criticism of the president, unequal access to the media for opposition and independent candidates, and violent disruptions of opposition campaign events. Legislation enacted during 2005, in particular the extremism law, national security amendments, and election law amendments, eroded legal protections for human rights and expanded the powers of the executive branch to regulate and control civil society and the media. But the Constitutional Court deemed unconstitutional a restrictive NGO law.

Uzbekistan’s human rights record, already poor, worsened considerably in 2005. A violent uprising in May in the city of Andijon led to disproportionate use of force by the authorities and a wave of repressive government actions that dominated the remainder of the year. The uprising started after a series of daily peaceful protests in support of businessmen on trial between February and May for Islamic extremism. On the night of May 12-13, unidentified individuals seized weapons from a police garrison, stormed the city prison where the defendants were being held, killed several guards, and released several hundred inmates, including the defendants. They then occupied the regional administration building and took hostages. On May 13, according to eyewitness accounts, government forces fired indiscriminately into a crowd that included unarmed civilians. resulting in hundreds of deaths. In the aftermath, the government harassed, beat, and jailed dozens of human rights activists, journalists, and others who spoke out about the events and sentenced numerous people to prison in trials that did not meet international standards. The government forced numerous domestic and international NGOs to close and severely restricted those that continued to operate.

In Russia, efforts continued to concentrate power in the Kremlin and direct democracy from the top down. To those ends, the Kremlin abolished direct elections of governors in favor of presidential nomination and legislative approval. In the current Russian context, where checks and balances are weak at best, this system limits government accountability to voters while further concentrating power in the executive branch. Amendments to the electoral and political party law amendments, billed as intended to strengthen nationwide political parties in the longer term, could in fact reduce the ability of opposition parties to compete in elections. This trend, taken together with continuing media restrictions, a compliant parliament, corruption and selectivity in enforcement of the law, political pressure on the judiciary, and harassment of some NGOs, resulted in an erosion of the accountability of government leaders to the people.

Pakistan’s human rights record continued to be poor, despite President Musharraf’s stated commitment to democratic transition and "enlightened moderation." Restrictions remained on freedom of movement, expression, association, and religion. Progress on democratization was limited. During elections for local governments in 2005, international and domestic observers found serious flaws, including interference by political parties, which affected the outcome of the vote in parts of the country. Police detained approximately 10 thousand Pakistan People’s Party activists in April prior to the arrival for a rally of Benazir Bhuto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari. The security forces committed extrajudicial killings, violations of due process, arbitrary arrest, and torture. Corruption was pervasive throughout the government and police forces, and the government made little attempt to combat the problem. Security force officials who committed human rights abuses generally enjoyed de facto legal impunity.

Despite hard realities and high obstacles, there is an increasing worldwide demand for greater personal and political freedom and for the spread of democratic principles. For example, in the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) region, recent years have witnessed the beginnings of political pluralism, unprecedented elections, new protections for women and minorities, and indigenous calls for peaceful, democratic change.

At the November 2005 Forum for the Future held in Manama, Bahrain, 40 leaders representing civil society organizations from 16 BMENA countries participated alongside their foreign ministers. The civil society leaders outlined a set of priorities with a particular focus on rule of law, transparency, human rights, and women's empowerment. Among those serving on this civil society delegation were representatives from the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), who presented the outcomes of discussions and debates held over the course of the year between civil society leaders and their government counterparts on the critical topics of election reform and the development of legitimate political parties. The growing DAD network includes hundreds of civil society leaders from the BMENA region. To better support growing reform efforts in the region, a Foundation for the Future to provide support directly to civil society and a Fund for the Future to support investment in the region, were also launched at the Forum. The level and depth of civil society participation at the Forum for the Future was historic and positive and set an important precedent for genuine dialogue and partnership between civil society and governments on issues of political reform.

The Forum for the Future is just one of the many mechanisms through which the United States, other Group of 8 countries, and regional governments support the indigenous desire for reform in the broader Middle East and North Africa.

The growing worldwide demand for human rights and democracy reflected in these reports is not the result of the impersonal workings of some dialectic or of the orchestrations of foreign governments. Rather, this call derives from the powerful human desire to live in dignity and liberty and from the personal bravery and tenacity of men and women in every age and in every society who serve and sacrifice for the cause of freedom.

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Russia Country Report on Human Rights Practices - 2005

The Russian Federation has a weak multiparty political system with a strong presidency, a government headed by a prime minister, and a bicameral legislature (Federal Assembly) consisting of a lower house (State Duma) and an upper house (Federation Council). The pro-presidential United Russia party controlled more than two‑thirds of the State Duma. The country had an estimated population of 143 million.

President Vladimir Putin was re-elected in March 2004 in an election process the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) determined did not adequately reflect principles necessary for a healthy democratic election, particularly in equal access to the media by all candidates and secrecy of the ballot. However, the voting itself was relatively free of manipulation, and the outcome was generally understood to have represented the will of the people. The government's human rights record in the continuing internal conflict in and around Chechnya remained poor. Both federal forces and their Chechen government allies generally acted with legal impunity. The civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces. Pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitaries at times appeared to act independently of the Russian command structure, and there were no indications that the federal authorities made any effort to rein in their extensive human rights abuses.

The most notable human rights development during the year was continued centralization of power in the executive branch, which was strengthened by changes in the parliamentary election laws and a move away from election of regional governors to their nomination by the president for confirmation by regional legislatures. This trend, taken together with continuing media restrictions and self-censorship, a compliant State Duma, continuing corruption and selectivity in enforcement of the law, political pressure on the judiciary, and harassment of some non‑governmental organizations (NGOs) resulted in an erosion of the accountability of government leaders to the people. There were reports of the following additional significant human rights problems:

alleged government involvement in politically motivated abductions, disappearances, and unlawful killing in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus
hazing in the armed forces, resulting in several deaths
harassment, and in some cases, abduction, of individuals who appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), reportedly to convince them to drop their cases
torture, violence, and other brutal or humiliating treatment
harsh and frequently life-threatening prison conditions
corruption in law enforcement
arbitrary arrest and detention
alleged executive branch influence over judicial decisions in certain high‑profile cases
government pressure that continued to weaken freedom of expression and media independence, particularly of major national networks
continued limitations, primarily by local authorities, on freedom of assembly and restrictions on some religious groups in some regions
societal discrimination, harassment, and violence against members of some religious minorities
restrictions on freedom of movement and migration
negative official attitudes toward, and sometimes harassment of, certain NGOs involved in human rights monitoring
violence against women and children
trafficking in persons
widespread governmental and societal discrimination as well as racially motivated attacks against ethnic minorities and persons from the Caucasus, Central Asia, Asia, and Africa
instances of forced labor

There were also positive developments with regard to human rights. The judiciary demonstrated greater independence in a number of cases. Reforms initiated in previous years continued to produce improvements in the criminal justice system. The authorities sought to combat instances of racial and ethnic mistreatment through prosecutions of groups and individuals accused of engaging in this behavior. Progress was also made in combating trafficking in persons.

Anti-government forces committed numerous human rights abuses in the internal conflict in Chechnya. They continued killing and intimidating local heads of administration. There were also reports of Chechen rebel involvement in both terrorist bombings and politically motivated disappearances in Chechnya and Ingushetiya during the year. Some Chechen rebels were allegedly involved in kidnapping to raise funds. There were also reports that explosives improvised by Chechen rebels often led to civilian casualties.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were no confirmed reports of political killings by the government or its agents, but there continued to be credible reports that federal armed forces engaged in unlawful killings in Chechnya. The use of indiscriminate force in areas of Chechnya with significant civilian populations resulted in numerous deaths (see section 1.g.). The security forces generally conducted their activities with impunity, but courts addressed a few incidents. For example, the Supreme Court overturned the acquittals of Captain Eduard Ullman and three other servicemen charged with killing six Chechen civilians in 2002 and ordered new trials. Lower courts had already acquitted the defendants twice, most recently in May. According to reports a retrial began in December and was continuing at year's end. At least one other serviceman was convicted on similar charges.

During the year the Ministry of Defense reported 16 deaths resulting from "non-statutory relations," a phrase used to describe situations in which officers or sergeants physically assaulted or humiliated their subordinates. Many observers complained that there was little accountability for such offenses. NGOs received numerous reports of such incidents. There were also reports linking suicides in the military to hazing (see section 1.c.).

Prison conditions were frequently life‑threatening (see section 1.c.).

Government forces and Chechen fighters continued to use landmines extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan. According to estimates by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) 3,037 victims were killed or wounded by landmines or unexploded ordnance in Chechnya since 1995. Over the last year, UNICEF noted a decline in the number of such incidents, attributed to increased awareness on the part of local inhabitants.

There were a number of killings of government officials throughout the country, some of which may have been connected with the ongoing strife in the North Caucasus or with politics. For example, Zagir Arukhov, the minister of nationalities, external relations, and information in the Republic of Dagestan, was assassinated on May 20 when a bomb exploded as he entered his apartment building. Deputy Prosecutor General Fridinskiy reported that, as of May 2004, Chechen rebels had killed 11 local administration heads since the antiterrorist operation in Chechnya began in 1999.

The press and media NGOs reported that journalists were killed during the year for reasons that appeared to be related to their work (see section 2.a.).

Violent and sometimes fatal attacks by skinhead groups were a problem. On November 13, Timur Kacharava, a university student and a member of an anti-fascist youth movement, was stabbed to death. Approximately 10 to 15 people attacked Kacharava and a friend in St. Petersburg. His friend survived the attack and was hospitalized with serious injuries. Kacharava's friends stated that the attackers were members of a neo-Nazi group that had previously attacked Kachavara. Observers believed that the attack may have been motivated by his activism in the youth anti-fascist movement. In December the authorities reported progress in the investigation of Kacharava's death. According to different sources, 5 to 11 people were arrested and five of them confessed to taking part in the attack. One of the suspects reportedly confessed that he stabbed Kacharava in the neck. All the arrested individuals allegedly claimed that they were members of a skinhead group.

As of year's end there were no indications that suspects had been apprehended in the June 2004 killing of hate-crimes expert Nikolay Girenko. His colleagues believed that the motive for the killing was Girenko's activity as an official expert witness in a number of high-profile court cases involving ethnic and religious issues.

No progress was reported in the investigation of the 2003 killing of Yuriy Shchekochikhin, a member of the State Duma and deputy editor of the newspaper Novaya Gazeta. At the time of his death, Shchekochikhin had begun to investigate allegations of Federal Security Service (FSB) responsibility for a series of 1999 apartment building bombings.

In June two of the initial six defendants were found guilty of terrorist acts and sentenced to 20 and 23 1/2 years in jail in a case involving the 1998 killing of Galina Starovoytova, a prominent State Duma deputy. The other four defendants were released. At year's end hearings were still ongoing for two additional defendants who were identified later in the investigation. The individual who ordered the killing has not been identified.

In June the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the parents of Dmitriy Kholodov, military affairs correspondent for the daily newspaper Moscovskiy Komsomolets, who was killed in 1994. Kholodov's killing was believed to have been associated with his investigation of corruption in the military. The parents had appealed a March 14 decision by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court to uphold a June 2004 acquittal of the defendants. Initial litigation began in 2000 (see section 2.a.).

During the September 2004 terrorist attack on a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, at least 330 hostages were killed. At least half of them were children (see section 1.g.).

Chechen rebels assassinated Chechen president Akhmed Kadyrov in May 2004, killed numerous civilian officials and militia associated with the federally appointed Chechen administration, and threatened to kill Kadyrov's successor Alu Alkhanov, who was elected in August 2004 (see section 1.g.). Chechen fighters killed a number of federal soldiers whom they had taken prisoner (see section 1.g.). Many other individuals were kidnapped and then killed in Chechnya during the year (see sections 1.b., 1.c., and 1.g.); both sides to the conflict, as well as criminal elements, were involved in those activities. Authorities often attributed bombings and other attacks on police or civilian officials in Dagestan and other areas in the southern part of the country to Chechen "bandits."

Societal violence against members of national, ethnic, and racial minority groups resulted in a number of killings (see section 5).

b. Disappearance

There were reports of government involvement in politically motivated disappearances in Chechnya and Ingushetiya, although the number of disappearances declined as compared to 2004. There were also reports of disappearances of individuals who had appealed court cases to the ECHR (see section 1.g.).

Criminal groups in the Northern Caucasus, possibly having links to rebel forces, frequently resorted to kidnapping. The main motivation behind such cases apparently was ransom, although some cases had political or religious overtones. The hostage‑takers held many of their victims in Chechnya or Dagestan.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibits such practices; however, there were credible reports that law enforcement personnel frequently engaged in torture, violence, and other brutal or humiliating treatment or punishment to coerce confessions from suspects and that the government did not consistently hold officials accountable for such actions. Although prohibited in the constitution, torture is defined neither in the law nor the criminal code. As a result, the only accusation prosecutors could bring against police suspected of such behavior was that they exceeded their authority or committed a simple assault.

Cases of physical abuse by police officers usually occurred within the first few hours or days of arrest. Some of the methods reportedly used were: beatings with fists, batons, or other objects; asphyxiation using gas masks or bags (at times filled with mace); electric shocks; or suspension by body parts (for example, suspending a victim from the wrists, which are tied together behind the back). Allegations of abuse were difficult to substantiate because of limited access by medical professionals. There were credible reports that both government forces and Chechen fighters in Chechnya tortured detainees (see section 1.g.).

Reports by refugees, NGOs, and the press suggested a pattern of police beatings, arrests, and extortion directed at persons with dark skin or who appeared to be from the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Africa, and at Roma. For example in June 2004 the press reported that in Novosibirsk 4 policemen were arrested on suspicion of extorting over $1 million (28 million rubles) from a Romani family by kidnapping and torturing family members until their demands were met. The policemen were reportedly later tried and convicted.

Police reportedly harassed defense lawyers by calling them in for questioning regarding their conversations with their clients and continued to intimidate witnesses (see section 1.e.).

In December 2004 in the course of a massive "crime prevention" crackdown in the town of Blagoveshchensk, Bashkortostan, police and masked OMON troops (members of a special police detachment) detained over one thousand persons; the police beat many of them. According to human rights activists who carried out an investigation of the events, at least 32 of those detained had to seek medical help afterward. Individuals were apprehended on the streets, in their homes, and in their places of business and brought to the cellar of the police headquarters building in Blagoveshchensk. Bashkortostan authorities claimed that the police actions were in response to a "crowd of rowdies" who had attacked a police patrol. On August 1, the Bashkortostan prosecutor's office filed a case against eight officials on the charge of abuse of office. Defendants included the chief of Blagoveshchensk police and the OMON unit commander. Preliminary hearings opened on September 14 and went on until November 17. The first substantial hearing took place on November 18. Defense attorneys said the court case could continue until 2008. Most of the defendants continued working in their positions. In May human rights groups said that during their investigation of these events they discovered instructions, which they linked to the federal Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), granting police the authority to use extreme force and set up detention centers in the event of large-scale protests. In December hecklers disrupted a meeting between human rights activists and some of the individuals beaten in Blagoveshchensk; at least one of human rights activist accused the authorities of being linked the disruption.

Various abuses against military servicemen, including but not limited to the practice of dedovshchina (the violent, at times fatal, hazing of new junior recruits in the armed services, MVD, and border guards) continued (see section 1.a.). Press reports cited serving and former armed forces personnel, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office (MMPO), and NGOs monitoring conditions in the armed forces as indicating that such mistreatment often included the use of beatings or threats of increased hazing to extort money or material goods. Government officials announced that approximately 25 percent of the 11,500 crimes committed in the army during 2004 were related to hazing. On May 24 the main military prosecutor stated that in 2004 246 servicemen committed suicide and that many of these deaths were linked to hazing. According to defense ministry figures, there were 218 suicides through October 2005. As of October, the Moscow Committee of Soldiers' Mothers registered 700 complaints from conscripts, mostly related to beatings. Servicemen also complained about sexual abuse, torture, and enslavement. Soldiers often did not report hazing to either unit officers or military prosecutors due to fear of reprisals, since in some cases officers reportedly tolerated or even encouraged such hazing as a means of controlling their units. Officers reportedly also used beatings to discipline soldiers.

Hazing reportedly was a particularly serious problem in units that had previously served in areas of military conflict.

Both the Union of Soldiers' Mothers Committee (USMC) and the MMPO received numerous reports about "nonstatutory relations," in which officers or sergeants physically assaulted or humiliated their subordinates. Despite the acknowledged seriousness of these problems, the leadership of the armed forces made only superficial efforts to implement substantive reforms in training, education, and administration programs within units to combat abuse.

During the year federal and pro‑Moscow Chechen forces, as well as Chechen rebel forces, violated the human rights of civilians, inflicting widespread civilian casualties, abductions, and other abuses (see section 1.g.).

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions remained extremely harsh and frequently life‑threatening. The Ministry of Justice's (MOJ's) Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (formerly the Main Division for the Execution of Sentences) administered most of the penitentiary system centrally from Moscow. The FSB ran the Lefortovo pretrial detention center in Moscow and seven other pretrial detention centers. There were five basic forms of custody in the criminal justice system: police temporary detention centers; pretrial detention facilities, known as investigation isolation facilities (SIZOs); correctional labor colonies (ITKs); prisons designated for those who violate ITK rules; and educational labor colonies (VTKs) for juveniles. As of July 1, approximately 797,500 persons were in the custody of the criminal justice system, including 48,600 women and 14,500 juveniles. On December 16, the MOJ reported that the number of the people held in custody in 2005 exceeded 800 thousand. In most cases juveniles were held separately from adults.

In 2004 according to official statistics approximately two thousand persons died in SIZOS. Most died as a result of poor sanitary conditions or lack of medical care (the leading cause of death was heart disease). The press reported on individuals who were mistreated, injured, or killed in various SIZOs. Some of the reported cases indicated habitual abuse by officers.

Abuse of prisoners by other prisoners continued to be a problem. Violence among inmates, including beatings and rape, was common. There were elaborate inmate‑enforced caste systems in which informers, homosexuals, rapists, prison rape victims, child molesters, and others were considered to be "untouchable" and were treated very harshly, with little or no protection provided by the prison authorities.

Penal institutions frequently remained overcrowded, but there were reports of some improvements. For example, while many penal facilities remained in urgent need of renovation and upgrading, some reports indicated that these facilities were closer to meeting government standards, which include the provision of four square meters per inmate.

Inmates in the prison system often suffered from inadequate medical care; however, there were some signs of improvement. The Public Council in the MOJ reported that during the 3 years ending in 2004, the number of sick prisoners and detainees decreased by 27 percent. According to the MOJ, as of September 1, 2005, there were approximately 49 thousand tuberculosis‑infected persons and 31 thousand HIV‑infected persons in SIZOs and correction colonies. Tuberculosis infection rates were far higher in detention facilities than in the population at large. The Moscow Center for Prison Reform (PCPR) reported that conditions in penal facilities varied among the regions.

Conditions in SIZOs, where suspects were held until the completion of a criminal investigation, trial, sentencing, or appeal, remained extremely harsh and posed a serious threat to health and life. However, conditions within different SIZOs varied considerably. Health, nutrition, and sanitation standards remained low due to a lack of funding. Poor ventilation was thought to contribute to cardiac problems and lowered resistance to disease. According to the Federal Prison Service, the total of detainees in the system increased by 31 thousand as of September 1. As a result, facilities originally designed to house 130 thousand held approximately 157 thousand suspects.

ITKs held the bulk of the nation's convicts. As of September 1, there were 633,500 inmates in 762 ITKs, which provided greater freedom of movement; however, at times, guards humiliated, beat, and starved prisoners to break down their resistance. The country's "prisons"‑‑distinct from the ITKs‑‑were penitentiary institutions for those who repeatedly violated the rules in effect in the ITKs.

The 62 VTKs held juvenile prisoners from 14 to 20 years of age. As of July 1 there were 62 such institutions. Conditions in the VTKs were significantly better than in the ITKs, but juveniles in the VTKs and juvenile SIZO cells reportedly also suffered from beatings and rape. The PCPR reported that such facilities had a poor psychological atmosphere and lacked educational and vocational training opportunities. Many of the juveniles were from orphanages, had no outside support, and were unaware of their rights. While juveniles were generally held separately from adults, there were two prisons in Moscow where children and adults were not separated and boys were held with adults in small, crowded, and smoky cells. Schooling in the prisons for children was sporadic at best.

In August the NGO For Human Rights reported that it had been able to monitor prisons in 40 of the country's 89 regions; however, according to the group's executive director, it has become increasingly difficult for domestic observers to monitor prison conditions in the last five years. Beginning in September 2004, authorities refused to grant the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access, under ICRC's standard criteria, to those detained as part of the conflict in Chechnya, and the ICRC subsequently suspended its detention visits.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, they remained problems.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The MVD, the FSB, and the Office of the Prosecutor are responsible for law enforcement at all levels of government. The FSB's core responsibilities are security, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism, but it also has broader law enforcement functions, including fighting crime and corruption. The FSB operated with limited oversight by the office of the prosecutor general and the courts.

The national police force, which falls under the MVD, is organized on the federal, regional, and local levels. Although regulations and national laws prohibit corrupt activities, corruption was widespread and with few crackdowns on illegal police activity. The government reportedly addressed only a fraction of the crimes that federal forces committed against civilians in Chechnya (see section 1.g.). Although government agencies, such as the MVD, have continued to educate officers about safeguarding human rights during law enforcement activities through training provided by foreign governments, the security forces remained largely unreformed.

There were credible reports that security forces continued regularly to single out persons from the Caucasus for document checks, detention, and the extortion of bribes (see section 2.d.). According to NGOs, federal forces and pro-Moscow Chechen militias commonly detained Chechen men at checkpoints along the borders between Chechnya and Ingushetiya in targeted operations known as "night raids," or during "mopping‑up" operations following military hostilities. Detainees were often beaten or tortured. Human rights groups also reported that security forces increasingly detained women.

Arrest and Detention

Under the law an individual may be taken into custody for 48 hours without court approval if arrested at the scene of a crime, provided there is evidence of the committed crime on the individual's person or in his house or when the crime victims or witnesses identify the person as a perpetrator. Otherwise, a court-approved arrest warrant is required. According to statistics provided by the Supreme Court's Judicial Department in 2004, courts approved approximately 91 percent of arrest requests from law enforcement authorities. A detainee is then typically taken to the nearest police station where a detainee should receive a warning of his rights, and police are obliged to write an official protocol signed by the detainee and the police officer within three hours of detention, which states the grounds for the detention. The police must interrogate the detainee within the first 24 hours, but prior to the interrogation the detainee has the right to meet with an attorney for 2 hours. No later than 12 hours after a detention, the police must notify the prosecutor and the detainee's relatives about the detention unless a prosecutor's warrant to keep the fact of detention secret is obtained. The detainee must be released after 48 hours, either subject to bail conditions or on their own recognizance, unless a court decides to keep the person in custody in response to a motion filed by the police no later than 8 hours before the expiration of the 48 hour detention period. The defendant and his/her attorney must be present at the court hearing.

The law specifies that within two months of a suspect's arrest, police should complete their investigation and transfer the file to the prosecutor for arraignment, although a court may extend the criminal investigation for up to six months in "complex" cases. With the personal approval of the prosecutor general a judge may extend that period up to 18 months.

These limitations on detention were generally respected; however, there were reports of occasional violations of the 48‑hour time limit following an arrest. Most frequently, the authorities failed to write the official protocol of detention within three hours after the actual detention and held suspects in excess of detention limits. In addition there were reports that the police obtained defense counsels friendly to the prosecution. These "pocket" defense counsels allowed interrogation of their clients. The general ignorance of legal rights by both citizens and their defense counsels contributed to the persistence of these violations. The government continued to engage in public education programs to inform citizens of their rights and responsibilities under the law, such as the right to a lawyer and the obligation to serve on juries. The Council of Judges together with the Supreme Court and the Russian Information Agency Novosti continued an educational program called "Public Trust" that explained the work of the judicial system and citizens' rights.

Judges suppressed confessions of suspects whose confessions were taken without a lawyer present. They also freed suspects who were held in excess of detention limits, although they usually granted prosecutors' motions to extend the detention period for good cause. The Supreme Court overturned a number of cases in which lower court judges granted permission to detain individuals on what the Supreme Court deemed inadequate grounds.

Some regional and local authorities continued to use provisions of the code to arrest persons for expressing views critical of the government. Human rights advocates in some regions were charged with libel, contempt of court, or interference in judicial procedures in cases with distinct political overtones. Journalists, among others, have been charged with other offenses and held either in excess of normal periods of detention or for offenses that do not require detention at all (see section 2.a.).

There were several reports of political detainees at various times during the year. Despite significant reforms in law enforcement in recent years, instances in which the government apparently pursued selective prosecution against political adversaries raised concerns over the arbitrary use of the judicial system. For example many observers considered the arrest, detention, and conviction on charges of fraud of prominent businessman Mikhail Khodorkovskiy to be an illustration of this problem, regardless of his guilt or innocence on the specific charges. In the months before his arrest in 2003, Khodorkovskiy had reportedly supported organizations, political parties, and media critical of the Putin administration. However, other observers believed that the case was driven by economic rather than political motives. Some human rights groups considered Svetlana Bakhmina, a lawyer who worked for Yukos Oil Company (Yukos), to be a political detainee. She was arrested in December 2004 on fraud charges and held without bail. Several organizations expressed concern about reports regarding Bakhmina's lack of access to her family and medical treatment while in custody. Some observers stated that she was being held in an attempt to pressure Dmitriy Gololobov, her former boss at Yukos, to return from London. On September 5, a Moscow city court ruled that she could be held in detention until October 7. In October her trial began in Moscow, and the case was ongoing at year's end. Many observers saw the treatment of Bakhmina as linked to the Khodorkovskiy case.

On two occasions the authorities held relatives of a wanted Chechen rebel leader, apparently attempting to force his surrender. Eight relatives of Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov were abducted in December 2004. On May 31, seven of them were released, several weeks after Maskhadov was killed on March 8. The human rights NGO, Memorial, reported that the detainees were held in an unfurnished concrete cell with a single window. They were allowed to exit the cell only to go to the toilet. They were never interrogated nor charged with any crime. An eighth relative, Movladi Aguyev, was reportedly charged with being a member of an illegal armed group. Witnesses to the initial detention believed the abductors were members of the forces under command of the Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov (see section 1.g.).

In May, according to Memorial, Chechen security forces seized relatives of Chechen commander Doku Umarov, including his 70-year-old father, his wife, and his 6-month-old son. They later released the wife and child, but the father's location remained unknown. According to the Chechen Ministry of Interior, unknown gunmen abducted Umarov's sister, Natasha Khumadova, in August. At year's end there was no further information on the whereabouts of Umarov's relatives.

In September 2004 several of Maskhadov's and Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev's relatives were taken into what authorities claimed to be protective custody during the Beslan school seizure, although human rights groups said this action was intended as retaliation for the seizure of the school; they were released shortly after the end of the school seizure. Domestic and foreign human rights observers criticized an October 2004 suggestion by the prosecutor general that a policy of seizing the relatives of hostage-takers would reduce the incidence of hostage taking.

Beginning in September 2004, authorities refused to grant the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access, under ICRC's standard criteria, to those detained as part of the conflict in Chechnya, and the ICRC subsequently suspended its detention visits.

An international NGO delegation that visited two psychiatric hospitals in 2004 noted that there was no judicial process for commitment that provided individuals subject to commitment with the right to appear before a court for a determination of the legality of their commitment.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The law provides for an independent judiciary, and there were a number of indications of judicial independence; however, the judiciary did not consistently act as an effective counterweight to other branches of the government. The law provides for strengthening the role of the judiciary in relation to the prosecutor general by requiring judicial approval of arrest warrants, searches, seizures, and detentions (see section 1.d.). Judges allegedly remained subject to influence from the executive, military, and security forces, particularly in high profile or politically sensitive cases. While judges' salaries have increased significantly, the judiciary remained susceptible to corruption. Judges accepted bribes from officials and others. From 2001 to 2004, 196 judges were fired for unprofessional behavior, 513 received "warnings," 12 were convicted of criminal offences. One NGO specializing in issues of corruption estimated that in 2005 judges received $209 million (5.9 billion rubles) in bribes annually for favorable rulings.

Authorities did not provide adequate protection from intimidation or threats from powerful criminal defendants.

The judiciary is divided into three branches. The courts of general jurisdiction, including military courts, are subordinated to the Supreme Court. These courts hear civil and criminal cases and include district courts, which serve every urban and rural district, regional courts, and the Supreme Court. Decisions of the lower trial courts can be appealed only to the immediately superior court unless a constitutional issue is involved. An arbitration (commercial) court system under the High Court of Arbitration constitutes a second branch of the judicial system. Arbitration courts hear cases involving business disputes between legal entities and between legal entities and the State. The federal constitutional court (as well as constitutional courts in a number of administrative entities of the Russian Federation) constitutes the third branch.

The president approves judges after they have been nominated by the qualifying collegia, which are assemblies of judges (including some public members). After a three-year trial period, the president must reconfirm the judges. Judicial watchers have alleged that the executive's role in approving and reconfirming judges has ensured an increasingly pro-Kremlin judiciary. The collegia also have the authority to remove judges for misbehavior and to approve prosecutors' requests to prosecute judges.

Justices of the peace deal with criminal cases involving maximum sentences of less than three years and with some civil cases. In some regions where the system has been fully implemented, justices of the peace assumed 65 percent of federal judges' civil cases and up to 32 percent of their criminal matters. Justices of the peace worked in all regions except Chechnya and Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrug.

Trial Procedures

Trials typically are conducted before a judge without a jury. The defendant is presumed innocent. The defense is not required to present evidence and is given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and call defense witnesses. Defendants who are in custody during the trial are confined to a caged area and must consult with their attorneys through the bars in whispers. Defendants have the right of appeal.

The law provides for the nationwide use of jury trials for a limited category of "especially grave" crimes, such as murder, in higher-level regional courts. These jury trials constituted approximately 1 percent of all criminal trials in 2004. By January 1 all regions except Chechnya implemented jury trials, and Chechnya is scheduled to introduce jury trials in 2007. In contrast to trials conducted by a judge, 0.7 percent of which ended in acquittal in 2004, approximately 15 percent of cases tried by juries ended in acquittals, although one‑quarter of those acquittals were later reversed on appeal.

Prior to trial, defendants are provided a copy of their indictment, which describes the charges in extensive detail. They are also given an opportunity to review the criminal file following the completion of the criminal investigation. Defense attorneys are allowed to visit their clients in prison, although prison conditions reportedly make it difficult for the attorneys to conduct meaningful and confidential consultations with their clients.

The law provides for the appointment of a lawyer free of charge if a suspect cannot afford one; however, this provision often was not effective in practice. The high cost of competent legal representation meant that lower‑income defendants often lacked competent legal representation. There were no defense attorneys in remote areas of the country. Public centers, staffed on a part time basis by lawyers, continued to offer free advice on legal rights and recourse under the law; however, they were not able to handle individual cases. In August the government issued regulations to govern an experimental program creating state legal aid offices in ten regions to operate on an experimental basis beginning in January 2006.

According to the NGO the Independent Council of Legal Expertise, defense lawyers were the targets of police harassment. Professional associations at both the local and federal levels reported police efforts to intimidate attorneys and cover up their own criminal activities. In March 2004 Yevgeniy Baru, lawyer for Khodorkovskiy's codefendant Platon Lebedev, was attacked after a visit with his client. Baru reported that prison officials, including the warden, confiscated written and printed materials from his briefcase. In April 2004 five men who reportedly shouted, "You got what you're asking for. No more speeches [in court] for you," knocked human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov unconscious on the Moscow metro. After regaining consciousness, Markelov discovered that his mobile phone containing the phone numbers of his clients, his lawyer's license card, and other identity documents and case files were missing, but his money had not been stolen. Amnesty International (AI) expressed concern that he was targeted due to his work on behalf of victims in several human rights cases that relate to Chechnya. On September 23, Robert Amsterdam, a member of Khodorkovskiy's international legal team had his visa revoked by the authorities and had to leave the country.

Authorities abrogated due process in continuing to pursue several espionage cases involving foreigners who allegedly obtained information considered sensitive by security services; in some instances prosecutors pursued such cases after earlier courts had rejected them. The proceedings in some of these cases took place behind closed doors, and the defendants and their attorneys encountered difficulties in learning the details of the charges. Observers believed that the FSB was seeking to discourage citizens and foreigners from investigating problems that the security services considered sensitive.

In February the FSB detained Oskar Kaibyshev on charges linked to exporting sensitive technological information to South Korea while working as a research scientist. Several scientific panels stated that the information Kaibyshev gave the South Koreans was not subject to export controls. The espionage charges initially brought against Kaibyshev were later dropped, but he still faced other criminal charges related to the case. Kaibyshev was later charged with unsanctioned export of technologies and theft. Court hearings opened in Ufa on October 31 behind closed doors. The trial was ongoing at year's end.

Political Prisoners

Many human rights organizations stated that Igor Sutyagin was a political prisoner, and the representatives of various domestic human rights organizations also characterized several other individuals, such as Valentin Danilov, Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, Platon Lebedev, Zara Murtazaliyeva, and Mikhail Trepashkin, as political prisoners.

On May 31, Mikhail Khodorkovskiy and co-defendant Platon Lebedev were convicted on six charges of fraud, tax evasion, and embezzlement and sentenced to 9 years in prison after an 11-month trial. Khodorkovskiy's conviction was upheld on appeal on September 21, with the sentence reduced to eight years. Both Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev continued to appeal their convictions. The arrest and conviction of Khodorkovskiy raised concerns about the rule of law, including the independence of courts, the right to due process, the sanctity of contracts and property rights, and the lack of a predictable tax regime. Many observers believed that Khodorkovskiy's conviction was the most recent of a number of politically‑motivated moves against wealthy "oligarchs" who represented centers of actual or potential political and media opposition to the president. Some observers believed that despite the possibility that the charges against Khodorkovskiy may have had some merit, he was selectively targeted for prosecution because of his own politically‑oriented activities and as a warning to other oligarchs against involvement in political affairs or providing financial support to independent civil society. In October the authorities transferred Khodorkovskiy to a prison in Chita Oblast and Lebedev to a prison in Yamalo-Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrug. In December Lebedev's defense team filed an appeal stating that sending him to a prison that was not in the area where Lebedev lived or was sentenced violated Russian law. Some human rights activists have objected to sentencing both men to prisons that were not in the area where they lived or were sentenced.

The May 2004 conviction of Mikhail Trepashkin, who had been a consultant to a parliamentary commission investigating possible FSB involvement in a series of 1999 apartment bombings, gave further cause for concern about the undue influence of the FSB and arbitrary use of the judicial system. The bombings were officially blamed on Chechens and served as partial justification for the government's resumption of the armed conflict against Chechen fighters. Trepashkin, an attorney and former FSB official, was arrested in 2003 and charged with disclosing state secrets and with illegal possession of a handgun and ammunition. The Moscow circuit military court sentenced him to four years of forced labor, but he was not expected to start serving his term until the conclusion of a hearing on the handgun charge. The trial reconvened in December 2004. Trepashkin's arrest came a month after his charges of FSB responsibility for the bombings were cited in a book and a week before he was scheduled to represent the relatives of a victim of one of those bombings. On April 15, a Moscow court found Trepashkin guilty of illegal possession of a handgun and added one year to his four-year term, although this additional ruling was later reversed on appeal. At the end of July, Trepashkin began serving his prison term in Nizhniy Tagil. On August 19, Trepashkin appealed for an early release from prison, and on August 29, a Nizhniy Tagil court granted him early release. On September 16, however, a Sverdlovsk regional court overturned the August 29 ruling. On September 22, according to reports, Trepashkin was again taken into custody. He was sent back to the Nizhniy Tagil prison camp. A new hearing on his early release was held on November 24, and the Nizhniy Tagil court turned down his application for release on parole. Trepashkin's attorneys had an appeal pending before the Sverdlovsk regional court at year's end. In a letter to State Duma deputy Yevgeniy Roizman, Trepashkin said he feared for his life since he was kept together with convicts who had committed capital crimes. In other statements, Trepashkin said that he was receiving no treatment for his severe asthma and that he was concerned about his health.

In June 2004 the Supreme Court overturned the 2003 jury acquittal of Valentin Danilov, who had been charged with spying for China while working on a commercial contract. In November 2004 Danilov was convicted by a judge and sentenced to 14 years. On June 29, the Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 13 years. Danilov has an appeal before the Supreme Court and the ECHR. In August he was transferred from a pretrial detention center to a prison.

In August the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by Igor Sutyagin, a disarmament researcher with the US and Canada Institute, against his conviction for espionage related charges. Prosecutors accused Sutyagin of passing classified information about the country's nuclear weapons to a London‑based firm, but the Kaluga regional court ruled in 2001 that the evidence presented by the prosecutor did not support the charges brought against him and returned the case to the prosecutor for further investigation. In April 2004 a Moscow city court found Sutyagin guilty and sentenced him to 14 years in a maximum security facility (the sentence included time served since his arrest in October 1999). Sutyagin claimed the decision was unjust and insisted that he had no access to confidential information. Some observers agreed that he had no access to classified information and described the severe sentence as an effort to discourage citizens from sharing sensitive information with professional colleagues from other countries. Russian government officials asserted that Sutyagin had wittingly or unwittingly entered into a paid arrangement with a foreign intelligence service. Because of the conduct of the trial and lengthy sentence, a number of domestic and international human rights NGOs raised concerns that the charges were politically motivated. At year's end Sutyagin was allegedly in a penal facility in Arkhangelsk Oblast and his attorneys were reportedly appealing the move.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The law states that officials may enter a private residence only in cases prescribed by federal law or on the basis of a judicial decision; however, authorities did not always observe these provisions. The law permits the government to monitor correspondence, telephone conversations, and other means of communication only with judicial permission and prohibits the collection, storage, utilization, and dissemination of information about a person's private life without his consent. While these provisions were generally followed, problems remained. There were accounts of electronic surveillance by government officials and others without judicial permission, and of entry into residences and other premises by Moscow law enforcement without warrants. There were no reports of government action against officials who violated these safeguards.

On September 1, the press reported that the government, citing concerns about terrorism, approved new regulations, which were scheduled to come into effect on January 1, 2006, for interactions between communication companies and certain government agencies. The new regulations would give law enforcement agencies greater access to telephone and cellular phone company clients' personal information and require providers to grant the MVD and FSB 24-hour remote access to their client databases. Some experts believed these new rules contradict the constitution.

Internet service providers are required to install, at their own expense, a device that routes all customer traffic to an FSB terminal, called the "System for Operational Investigative Measures." However, there appeared to be no mechanism to prevent unauthorized FSB access to the traffic or private information without a warrant. The FSB was not required to give telecommunications companies and individuals documentation on targets of interest prior to accessing information.

Human rights observers continued to allege that officers in the special services used their services' power to gather compromising materials on public figures. There were credible charges that regional branches of the FSB continued to exert pressure on citizens employed by foreign firms and organizations, often to coerce them into becoming informants.

Federal forces and pro-Moscow Chechen forces reportedly abducted relatives of rebel commanders and fighters (see section 1.g.).

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal and External Conflicts

During the year unrest continued in and around the Northern Caucasus republic of Chechnya. Federal forces and pro‑Moscow Chechen forces engaged in human rights violations, including torture, summary executions, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. Chechen rebels also committed human rights violations, including major acts of terrorism and summary executions.

The year saw a continued shift of Russian tactics away from operations involving Russian military formations and toward police operations, and from the use of federal forces toward reliance on paramilitary and police units of the Chechen Republic. There were fewer mopping-up operations, known as "zachistki," than in previous years, although more targeted operations, such as night raids, continued. According to Memorial, zachistki were often conducted with no serious human rights abuses, but Memorial noted that in some cases, zachistki were accompanied by abductions, looting, and beatings. Chechen security forces were nominally under the control of Chechen civilian authorities but also often conducted operations jointly with Russian federal forces. In reality, Chechen security forces were under the command of Chechen First Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov and often appeared to act with relative independence. The limited measures taken by the federal and Chechen leaders to rein them in have been largely ineffective.

Federal authorities‑‑both military and civilian‑‑have limited journalists' and human rights observers' access to war zones since the beginning of the second war in Chechnya in 1999, in part due to security concerns. In addition coverage has been restricted in government‑controlled media, and the government has sought to pressure independent journalists into engaging in self-censorship (see sections 2.a. and 4). These restrictions made independent observation of conditions and verification of reports difficult and limited the available sources of information about the conflict. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported in March that Chechnya was gripped by a climate of fear that witnesses described as "worse than war." HRW noted that victims of human rights abuses and their relatives were increasingly reluctant to speak to human rights monitors or to file complaints with the authorities because they feared further persecution, a fear HRW had not previously encountered. Despite these obstacles, however, human rights groups with staff in the region continued to release credible reports of human rights abuses committed during the year.

The indiscriminate use of force by government troops, which during the course of the conflict has resulted in widespread civilian casualties, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons, and massive destruction of property and infrastructure, appeared to decrease during the year. However, Memorial reported that in comparison to 2001-2002, government forces used less indiscriminate force in 2004 against civilian areas and this trend appeared to continue in 2005.

Nonetheless, there continued to be instances of indiscriminate use of force by government troops. According to Memorial, the mountain village of Zumsoi was subjected to repeated artillery shelling and aerial bombardment as well as sweeps by security forces during the year. In January the village was bombed for several days. Airborne forces then arrived in the village and took three men and a teenaged boy into custody. Their whereabouts remain unknown. Federal servicemen also allegedly robbed villagers, desecrated the village mosque, and killed cattle. In July unknown perpetrators, who were believed to be Chechen rebels, killed the head of the village administration. Also in July all but one of Zumsoi's residents left the village citing the continuing insecurity there.

In June members of the pro-Moscow Vostok (East) Battalion conducted a security sweep in the village of Borozdinovskaya. During that operation 11 men from the village were detained. Some homes in the village were burned and two villagers were killed. Subsequently villagers left en masse and crossed into the neighboring republic of Dagestan. Although prosecutors announced an investigation, and federal and Chechen officials publicly called for those responsible to be held accountable, the whereabouts of the men remain unknown. Military prosecutors initiated criminal proceedings against one Vostok commander Mukhadi Aziyev. A military court in Chechnya convicted him in October of abuse of power, and he received a three-year suspended sentence.

In most cases security actions affecting civilians were undertaken with impunity. Even the limited efforts of the authorities to impose accountability were frequently timid. On March 29, a Groznyy court convicted Lt. Sergey Lapin, a member of an OMON riot police unit, of inflicting serious harm to health and other charges related to the torture and disappearance of Chechen citizen Zemlikhan Murdalov in 2001. AI noted, however, that none of the charges against Lapin related to Murdalov's actual disappearance, nor were any others charged in the case.

Despite the opening of a criminal case, a human rights organization reported that no charges were filed after a federal warplane bombed Maidat Tsintsayeva's house in April 2004, killing her and her five children. According to a human rights NGO, there were no indications of progress in investigating the launching of several missiles at the village of Tevzen‑Kale in December 2004. One of the missiles hit the house of the Suleymanov family, killing one family member and wounding two others. The Chechen interior ministry told the press that the federal military refused to acknowledge that it had bombed the village and was impeding all investigation efforts.

There were no reliable estimates of civilian casualties as a result of military operations. Chechen State Council Chairman Taus Dzhabrailov reportedly told the press in June that more than 160 thousand persons had been killed in Chechnya since 1994. Memorial has estimated that 75 thousand civilians and up to 14 thousand servicemen have died during the two Chechen conflicts.

Likewise, there were no reliable estimates of the number of those detained, abducted, or made to disappear. While Chechen rebels and criminals seeking ransom carried out many abductions and disappearances, federal and pro-Moscow Chechen forces were also involved. Government sources indicated that 67 people were abducted through mid-December compared to 168 in 2004, according to press reports. Chechen President Alu Alkhanov said 77 people were abducted in 2005, compared to 213 in 2004. Memorial reported that in the 25 to 30 percent of Chechnya to which its monitors had access, 316 persons were abducted during the year, of whom 151 were freed or ransomed, 23 were found dead, 15 were thought to be in detention, and 127 disappeared. Memorial reported that 448 persons were abducted in 2004 and has estimated that 3 thousand to 5 thousand have gone missing in Chechnya since 1999. Memorial reported that it has information on 1,200 cases where people disappeared after being detained by federal security forces since fall 1999. The federal prosecutor's office reported in December 2004 that 2,437 persons had been abducted in Chechnya in that period.

Abductions and disappearances continued to occur following operations conducted by federal forces, pro-Moscow Chechen forces, and joint operations involving Chechen and Russian units, according to various sources. Presidential Advisor Aslanbek Aslakhanov was cited in the press as saying that he could not rule out the involvement of forces under command of Chechen First Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov or federal forces in such activities. Colonel General Arkadiy Yedelev, head of the Russian forces general staff in the Northern Caucasus, acknowledged in February that federal forces and pro-Moscow Chechen forces had taken part in disappearances of civilians.

On April 15, security forces detained Murad Muradov, the director of the Chechen NGO "Let's Save the Generation" during a firefight between federal forces and Chechen fighters in Groznyy. According to human rights groups, Muradov was detained because he lived near the apartment where rebels were hiding. His whereabouts are unknown.

Following the numerous arrests made after the October attack on Nalchik, HRW reported that there were at least eight cases where detainees were ill treated and that lawyers for five detainees were barred from representing their clients on spurious grounds. Additionally, Ruslan Nakhushev, the head of the Islamic Research Institute in Nalchik who sought to promote dialogue between authorities and the Muslim community, disappeared on November 4 after being questioned by the Federal Security Service. Authorities had opened a criminal case against him in October for allegedly organizing the attack on Nalchik

There were no indications that the authorities intended to take action as a result of a January 2004 sweep of the town of Argun which resulted in the abduction and torture of a many residents and the killing of two. Only after mass protests in Argun were most of the detainees released. All showed signs of physical abuse and required medical attention.

Although incidents continued, the statistics of both the authorities and Memorial appeared to point to a decline in abductions and disappearances compared to previous years, but human rights groups and the authorities interpreted the data differently. Government spokesmen attributed the apparent decline in abductions to efforts begun by the Chechen government in June 2004 to reinforce existing requirements that military forces have license plates on their vehicles when entering a village, be accompanied by a representative of the prosecutor's office and local officials, identify themselves when entering a house, prepare lists of all persons arrested during the operation, and share those lists with local authorities. Chechen officials subsequently declared a ban on law enforcement officers wearing masks. Colonel General Arkadiy Yedelev, chief of counterterrorist operations in the Northern Caucasus, asserted that requirements that regional security headquarters approve all raids to detain suspected rebels and that Chechen prosecutors be notified of such operations in advance had led to a decrease in abductions.

Human rights groups attributed at least part of the statistical decline to the reluctance of detainees' relatives to complain to the authorities or human rights groups out of fear of reprisals. Citing numerous incidents in which unidentified armed men wearing camouflage broke into houses and abducted civilians, they expressed skepticism about government assertions that regulations governing the behavior of security forces were being more closely observed.

Although federal forces were believed to have engaged in fewer abductions, this was to some extent offset by the increasing role of the pro-Moscow Chechen security forces under the command of Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, either by themselves or in joint operations with federal forces. Human rights groups reported that these forces were frequently suspected of disappearances and abductions, including those of family members of rebel commanders and fighters. The International Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights estimated in a February report that Kadyrov's militia was responsible for up to 75 percent of the crimes in Chechnya. For example the press reported that a 25-year-old resident of Argun was found dead in a rock quarry in June after members of the militia arrested him. Two days after being arrested, the victim was released after having been badly beaten. A few days later, he was ordered to return for further questioning and was not seen again until his body was discovered.

According to human rights observers, government forces responding to Chechen attacks at times engaged in indiscriminate reprisals against combatants and noncombatants. Federal forces were believed to be responsible for the June 2004 killing of Umar Zabiyev, a civilian, near the Ingush village of Galashki.

AI reported federal and Chechen security forces increasingly targeted female civilians, both in response to terrorist bombings carried out by Chechen women and to put pressure on male relatives suspected of being rebels. According to AI security forces detained 70-year-old Maret Khutsaeva and her teenaged granddaughter on May 10. Armed men in camouflage, without masks and speaking Chechen, arrived at her home and reportedly asked her where her son Arbi Khutsayev was. The two were held for one day and released on the condition that Khutsayev give himself up, with the warning that they would be detained again if he did not do so. Security forces also detained Natasha Khumadova, the sister of Chechen field commander Doku Umarov.

The whereabouts of Milana Ozdoyeva, whom the security forces questioned twice in January 2004 about her alleged plans to become a suicide bomber, were unknown. In January 2004 several men entered her house and took her away, leaving her two children behind.

Troops also reportedly kidnapped and otherwise mistreated children (see section 5).

Abductions reportedly continued in Ingushetiya. Memorial stated that 33 people were reported abducted during the year. Of them, 9 were freed, 4 were found dead, and 10 others disappeared. The remaining 10 were later found in the custody of law enforcement agencies.

AI and other human rights groups reported that Adam Gorchkhanov disappeared from the village of Plievo, Ingushetiya, on May 23. Gorchkhanov was reportedly detained in a raid involving 40 members of an unknown security service. He and his younger brother were beaten and the house searched, although security forces presented no warrant. Relatives subsequently learned that he had been held in the pretrial detention center in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, and later transferred to the Regional Department for the Fight Against Organized Crime under the MVD. On May 28, relatives learned that he had been taken to a hospital where, according to police statements, he jumped from a fourth floor window. A doctor, however, later told Memorial that Gorchkhanov had been admitted with a serious head injury. He died on May 30 from his injuries.

AI reported that prosecutors were continuing their investigation into the March 2004 disappearance of Ingush deputy prosecutor Rashid Ozdoyev after he submitted a report on alleged FSB abuses in Ingushetiya. Ozdoyev's whereabouts remain unknown, and no suspect has been identified in the case.

Throughout the year security forces continued to conduct security sweeps and passport checks at temporary settlements in Ingushetiya housing internally displaced persons IDPs from Chechnya. These sweeps sometimes led to reports of human rights abuses or disappearances.

Following rebel attacks across Ingushetiya in June 2004, federal forces conducted sweeps in several settlements housing IDPs from Chechnya. Human rights groups reported cases in which military personnel beat or verbally abused persons during these sweeps; however, the 20 IDPs they arrested were all released. Human rights groups also reported that several dozen Ingush and Chechens disappeared in Ingushetiya. As with similar operations in Chechnya, reports of beatings, arbitrary detentions, and looting usually followed security sweeps. Five men remain missing following a 2003 incident in which, according to HRW, pro‑Moscow Chechen police burst into a clinic in Ingushetiya and abducted the men, one of whom was injured. One of the policemen struck a doctor with a rifle.

Pro‑Moscow Chechen forces commanded by Ramzan Kadyrov and federal troops continued to arrest relatives of Chechen separatist leaders and fighters in an effort to force them to surrender, according to human rights groups. They noted that this practice may be linked to an October 2004 speech by Prosecutor General Ustinov suggesting that authorities detain relatives of alleged members of armed opposition groups in response to their hostage‑taking (see section 1.d.).

On March 28, according to Memorial, Zaudi Sadulayev, aged 65, and his son were detained by forces under the command of Kadyrov in the village of Mairtup. Another of Sadulayev's sons was allegedly a member of the Chechen resistance. Similar cases cited by Memorial included the detention of a 13-year-old boy in the village of Noviye Atagi by Kadyrov's forces and the abduction of four members of the Sirazhdiyev family on May 26 by unknown security forces in revenge for the killing of a member of the Vostok battalion.

Press and human rights groups reported that in September 2004, during the hostage taking in Beslan, federal forces took into custody relatives of Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev, and Doku Umarov, whom authorities accused of organizing the terrorist attack. Federal forces stated this was for the relatives' protection, but human rights groups alleged that the relatives would be used in a potential trade for hostages at the school. The relatives were subsequently released, but in December 2004, according to Memorial, eight relatives of Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov were abducted. Maskhadov's relatives were released in May 2005, after federal forces killed him in March (see section 1.d.).

Government forces and Chechen rebel fighters have used landmines extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan since 1999; but there were fewer civilian landmine victims in Chechnya during the year. Federal forces and their opponents continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, although the publication, Landmine Monitor, reported that Chechen fighters increasingly used improvised explosive devices. Reports suggested that the number of landmine casualties was declining over time. According to 2005 statistics, UNICEF recorded 24 new civilian mine/UXO (unexploded ordinance) casualties, including 14 killed and 10 injured; 7 were children (5 killed and 2 injured). According to UNICEF, as of December 31, there were 3,037 landmine and UXO casualties in Chechnya since 1995. Of these, 2,338 were wounded and 699 killed. Among the ca

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